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JURISDICTIONAL AUTHORITY
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-85 (CodeCo 1986) and Rule 3 of
the Rules of the Utah Court of Appeals (CodeCo 1987).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
Kennecott Copper Corporation ("Kennecott") presents on
appeal the following issues;
1.

Whether the Industrial Commission had jurisdiction

to make an award to Applicant for workers1 compensation benefits
with regard to his injuries of September, 1961 through November,
1976, notwithstanding the fact that Applicant did not give notice
to the Industrial Commission within either three years of the
date of the injuries or the date of last payment of compensation
for those injuries or within eight years of the date of the
injuries, if tolled, as required under Utah Code Ann, Section
35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986),
2.

Whether, as a matter of law, there was a factual

basis upon which the Industrial Commission

could support the

finding of fact and conclusion of law that Applicant had complied
with

the

notice

requirements

under

Utah

Code

Ann,

Sections

35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) with regard to his injuries
incurred between September, 1961 and November, 1976.
3.

Whether the Industrial Commission had authority to

make an award to Applicant

for workers1

compensation benefits

with regard to his injuries incurred between September, 1961 and

November, 1976, notwithstanding the fact that Applicant did not
file a claim for compensation within the statute of limitations
period

imposed under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-99

(CodeCo

1986).
4.

Whether Kennecott was denied due process of law

with regard to the Industrial Commission's award, since Kennecott
was given no notice prior to the hearing that the Commission
would

consider

Kennecott's

liability

in

connection

with

Applicant's injuries from September, 1966 through June, 1984 and,
therefore, was not provided with the opportunity to prepare an
adequate defense.
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES
Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100, relied
upon by Kennecott are attached hereto as Appendices A and B,
respectively, pursuant to Rule 24(a)(6) of the Rules of the Utah
Court of Appeals (CodeCo 1987).
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order issued on January 14, 1987 by the Industrial Commission through its Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ")
Timothy C. Allen and the Commission's affirmance thereof on March
6, 1987.

In the January 14, 1987 decision, the ALJ ordered

Kennecott to pay 100% of the total benefits payable to Applicant,
based on a finding that Kennecott was responsible for all of
Applicant's

injuries

from

1961

-2-

through

1984.

On

or

about

February 11, 1987, Kennecott, in accordance with Utah Code Ann,
Section

35-1-82.55

(CodeCo

1986)

filed

a Motion

for

Review

requesting review and reconsideration by the Industrial Commission of the Order of January 14, 1987, awarding benefits.
March

6,

1987r

the

Industrial

Commission

denied

On

Kennecott's

Motion for Review and upheld the ALJ's award to Applicant.
Therefore, this appeal is taken from the Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order by the ALJ issued on January
14, 1987, and Order Denying Motion for Review by the Industrial
1
Commission issued on March 6, 1987 (collectively referred to as
the "Orders").
Appendices

Copies of these Orders are attached hereto as

C and D, respectively.

Kennecott*s

Petition for

Review of the Industrial Commission Award was filed with this
Court on April 3, 1987.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Applicant Angelo Maldonado was employed by Kennecott
from May 31, 1961, until October 1, 1985, at which time he was
placed on the company-sponsored permanent and total disability
pension based on an occupational hearing loss.

Applicant was

first employed as a laborer for Kennecott and later employed as a
puncher.

As a puncher, Applicant was required to keep air vents

1

The Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order entered
by the ALJ and subsequently adopted by the Industrial Commission
in its Order Denying Motion for Review are hereinafter referred
to as the Findings and Conclusions of the Commission.
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under the furnace clean.

On September 21, 1961, Applicant, while

working on the No. 2 Converter, slipped and sustained an injury
to his lower back and neck.

He was assisted to the Kennecott

Clinic where his lower back and neck were treated for a period of
two weeks.

Thereafter, Applicant returned to work.

On or about March 21, 1986, Applicant filed an Application for Hearing ("Application") with the Industrial Commission,
requesting compensation for injuries sustained during the course
of his employment on September 21, 1961.

Although notice of

Applicant's 1961 injury was given to Kennecott within one year
from the date of the accident as required by Utah Code Ann.
Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986), neither notice of injury was given
nor claim of compensation made with regard to the 1961 injury to
the

Industrial

Commission

within

the

prescribed

limitations

period under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo
1986).
During

the

course

of

the

hearing,

scheduled

on

August 20, 1986 to hear testimony regarding the September 21,
1961 injury, the ALJ informed Kennecott, despite no notice to
Kennecott prior to the hearing, that Applicant's case appeared to
be a claim for permanent and total disability and that testimony
would be heard on all of Applicant's

injuries

incurred as a

result of his employment with Kennecott, including the hearing
loss.

In response to inquiries by the ALJ, Applicant testified

to additional injuries on September 22, 1966, January 21, 1971,

-4-

November 7, 1976, March 6, 1980, November 18, 1982, April 26,
1983 and June 20, 1984.
Kennecott agrees that Applicant's filing of the March,
1986 Application satisfied the notice requirement to the Industrial Commission under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 (CodeCo
1986) for the industrial injuries which occurred on November 18,
1982, April 26, 1983 and June 20, 1984. Kennecott further agrees
that Applicant's claim filed on March 21, 1986, satisfied the
statute of

limitations

under Utah Code Ann. Section

35-1-99

(CodeCo 1986) for his industrial injuries of 1982, 1983 and 1984.
Since Applicant gave notice of the November 18, 1982, April 26,
1983 and June 20, 1984 injuries to both his employer and the
Industrial Commission within the prescribed time limitations set
forth under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo
1986), the Industrial Commission had the requisite jurisdiction
to make an award of compensation with respect to Applicant's
1982, 1983 and 1984 injuries.
Although Applicant gave notice of his injuries between
September,

1966

and

November,

1976

to Kennecott

within

the

one-year time requirement, there exists no evidence in the record
that Applicant gave notice to or made a claim for compensation
with the Industrial Commission with respect to those injuries, as
required
(CodeCo
temporary

under Utah
1986).
total,

Code Ann. Sections

Moreover,
temporary

Kennecott
partial,

-5-

35-1-99

has

never

permanent

and

35-1-100

provided

any

partial

or

permanent total compensation for any of the injuries sustained by
Applicant between September, 1961 and November, 1976.
Adopting the findings of the Medical Panel, the Commission found that Applicant had sustained a 10% permanent partial
impairment relating to his injuries between September, 1961 and
June, 1984.

This impairment rating is based upon Applicant's

having sustained a 5% permanent partial impairment due to the
injury of September 21, 1961, a 1% permanent partial impairment
due to the injury of September 22, 1966, a 2% permanent partial
impairment due to the injury of November 16, 1976, a 1% permanent
partial impairment due to the injury of November 18, 1982 and a
1% permanent partial impairment due to the injury of June 20,
1984.

The Commission,

Medical Panel,
regard

found

to Applicant's

Commission

further

adopting

a 3% permanent

the findings of the

partial

industrial-related

impairment

hearing

loss.

with
The

further found a 4% impairment due to arthritis in

Applicant's knee as a result of pre-existing conditions.

Having

found no permanent aggravation of Applicant's pre-existing knee
problems in the injuries of 1961 through 1984, the Commission
found no liability against the Second Injury Fund.

The Commis-

sion ordered Kennecott to pay 100% of the total benefits payable
to Applicant, based on a finding that Kennecott was responsible
for all of Applicant's injuries from 1961 through 1984.
However, Kennecott objects to the Commission's findings
of fact and legal conclusion that Kennecott is responsible for

-6-

Applicant's

total

impairment

relating

to

September, 1961 through November, 1976.

his

injuries

from

The Commission lacked

jurisdiction to make an award to Applicant for compensation with
regard

to

those

Applicant's

injuries.

total

impairment

Accordingly,
(61.5%)

the

relating

percentage
to

of

Applicant's

injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976 should be
regarded as pre-existing injuries and, therefore, the responsibility of the Second Injury Fund.

See Utah Code Ann, Section

35-1-69 (CodeCo 1986).
Furthermore, Kennecott contends that the portion of the
Commission's
Applicant's

Order

that

imposes

injuries between

liability

September,

on

Kennecott

for

1966 and June, 1984,

without prior notice to Kennecott, was made without due process
of law as guaranteed by the Federal and State Constitutions and,
therefore, should be set aside by this Court.
Thus,

unlike

the

position

taken in
Kennecott v.
2
Industrial Commission and Kenneth Davis (Case No, 860228-CA), a
case argued before this Court on April 29, 1987, Kennecott

z

Although the legal issues raised in Maldanado are virtually
identical to those raised in Davis, there are factual distinctions between the two cases that necessitate a slightly different
outcome. In Davjjs, Kennecott objected on jurisdictional and constitutional grounds to the imposition of liability with regard to
applicant's injuries in 1969 and 1976, but Kennecott did not
contest liability arising from applicant's claim of compensation
for his injury of September, 1984 since it was the injury for
which he actually filed a claim. Furthermore, notice of that
claim was given to Kennecott in a timely manner. However, in
Maldanado, Kennecott contests Applicant's claim of compensation
-7-

contends in the instant matter that the Commission's Findings of
Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order must be set aside by this
Court in its entirety on jurisdictional and/or constitutional
grounds.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 clearly
mandate that an applicant notify his employer within one year
from the date of an industrial accident, and that a claim for
compensation or notice be given to the Commission within either
three years of the date of the accident or the date of the last
payment of compensation for that accident, or within eight years
of the date of the accident, if tolled.
an applicant

to satisfy

both

Failure on the part of

requirements with

regard

to a

particular industrial injury effectively bars the Commission from
asserting jurisdiction over a claim of compensation for that
injury.
In the instant matter, Applicant gave no notice of his
injuries

between

Commission.

September, 1961

and November,

1976

to the

Applicant further failed to make a claim of compen-

sation before the Commission within the required time period from

for his September, 1961 injury, the injury which formed the basis
of his actual written claim, on jurisdictional grounds as well as
the imposition of liability for Applicant's injuries between 1966
and 1984 on jurisdictional and/or constitutional grounds because
Kennecott had no notice of these injuries in the claim*

-8-

3
the date of the injuries.

Accordingly, the Commission never

obtained jurisdiction under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 so as
to have authority to compensate Applicant at Kennecott's expense
for the
Having

injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976.
never

obtained

jurisdiction

injuries, the Commission

over

acted without

Applicant's
or

in excess

previous
of

its

authority in affirming the compensation award based, in part, on
those injuries.

The award, having in part been made in disregard

and in violation of the jurisdictional requirements as established and followed by the Utah Supreme Court in its interpretations of Sections 35-1-99 and

35-1-100 of the Utah Workers'

Compensation Act, should therefore be set aside.
Furthermore, in order for the Commission to reach the
conclusion that Kennecott is responsible to pay workers' compensation benefits for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961
and November, 1976, the Commission would have to make a finding
of fact that Applicant

complied with the notice requirements

under Utah Code Ann. Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100.

The Commis-

sion, however, made no findings of fact as to whether Applicant
gave notice to or filed a claim for compensation with the Commission within the prescribed time period.

Indeed, there is no

evidence in the record which would have allowed the Commission to

3

In fact, with the exception of his September 21, 1961
injury, Applicant has never made a claim of compensation for his
injuries between September, 1961 and June, 1984.

-9-

make such findings.

With the exception of his September, 1961

injury, Applicant never filed a claim for compensation with the
Commission for those injuries.

Thus, there exists no factual

basis to support the legal conclusion that the Commission had
obtained jurisdiction over Applicants injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976 so as to justify its imposition of
liability on Kennecott

for those injuries.

Furthermore, the

Commission's failure to make the required findings of fact is
reversible error and, therefore, the award must be set aside.
Moreover, the Commission's decision in this matter completely ignores the period of limitation established under Utah
Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986).

Since Applicant has not

filed a timely claim for compensation for his injuries between
September, 1961 and November, 1976, Applicant's right to compensation for those injuries is wholly barred under Section 35-1-99.
Finally, the hearing

that took place on August 20,

1986, before the ALJ, which gave rise to the award of the Commission, was for injuries resulting from Applicant's accident in
September, 1961.

Kennecott had no notice prior to the hearing

that the Commission would consider Kennecott's liability with regard to Applicant's injuries from September, 1966 through June,
1984 and, therefore, was unable to adequately prepare a defense.
Accordingly, Kennecott has been denied procedural due process of
law in connection with the compensation award to Applicant for
his injuries between September, 1966 and June, 1984 and, there-

•10-

fore, the award should be set aside, in part, on constitutional
grounds.
ARGUMENT
I.

SINCE APPLICANT FAILED EITHER TO GIVE TIMELY
NOTICE TO OR TO FILE A CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION
WITH THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION FOR HIS INJURIES BETWEEN SEPTEMBER, 1961 AND NOVEMBER,
1976, THE COMMISSION LACKED JURISDICTION TO
AWARD COMPENSATION TO APPLICANT FOR THOSE
INJURIES.
The Commission

tion to Applicant
November, 1976.

lacked jurisdiction to award compensa-

for his

injuries between Septemer, 1961 and

The Commission, a fortiori, had no authority to

impose libility on Kennecott for those injuries.
S

35-1-100

requirements

(CodeCo

1986),

that must

which

be satisfied

establishes
before

Utah Code Ann.
jurisdictional

the Commission

can

hear a claim for compensation, provides:
Whenever an employee sustains an accident
arising out of or in the course of his
employment, the employee shall file with the
Commission,
in writing,
notice
of
such
accident, with a copy to the employer; if
such notice is so filed within three years of
the time of the accident or within the time
limitation provided in Section 35-1-99, the
Commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make
its award when the injury becomes apparent.
[Emphasis added.]
The requirements of Section 35-1-100 must be read in
conjunction with those of Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986),
which

establishes

a statute

of

limitations

for all claims of

"compensation" filed with the Commisson:
If no claim for compensation is filed with
the Industrial Commission within three years
-11-

from the date of the accident or the date of
the last payment of compensation, the right
to compensation is wholly barred.
However, the filing of a report or notice of
accident
or
injury with
the
Industrial
Commission, the employer, or its insurance
carrier, together with the payment of any
compensation benefit or the furnishing of
medical treatment by the employer or an
insurance carrier, tolls the period for
filing the claim until the employer or its
carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of
its denial of liability or further liability
for the industrial accident or injury, with
instructions upon the notification of denial
to the employee to contact the Industrial
Commission for further advice or assistance
to preserve or protect the employee's rights.
Claims for compensation in any event shall be
filed within eight years after the date of
the accident. [Emphasis added.]
Read

together,

mandate

that an employee

arising

out of or

Sections

35-1-100

claiming

and

35-1-99

to have sustained

in the course of his employment

an

clearly
injury

notify his

employer within one year from the date of the alleged industrial
accident.

Moreover, the employee must either give notice to or

make a claim for compensation with the Commission within either
three years of the date of the accident or the date of the last
payment of compensation for that accident, or within eight years
of the date of the accident, if tolled.

Failure to satisfy both

notice requirements with regard to an industrial
tively precludes

the Commission

hear a claim of compensation

from asserting

for said

injury.

injury effec-

jursidiction to
See Dean Evans

Chrysler Plymouth v. Morse, 692 P.2d 779, 782 (Utah 1984), aff'd

-12-

in Mecham v.

Industrial Commission, 692 P.2d

783, 785 (Utah

1984).
These provisions place the burden of giving notice to
the Commission squarely on the employee.

Thus, Applicant in the

instant matter clearly had the duty to give the Commission notice
of his

injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976.

Having failed to impart the requisite notice on the Commission,
the Commission is precluded from asserting jurisdiction to hear a
claim of compensation for Applicant's injuries between September,
1961 and November, 1976.

Any award of compensation premised on

those injuries, whether made directly or indirectly in connection
with an award of another injury, is therefore barred by Utah Code
Ann, Section 35-1-100.

To conclude otherwise would be contrary

to both the literal language of Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-100,
as well as Utah Supreme Court decisions interpreting this provision. See Peterson v. Industrial Commission. 29 Utah 2d 446, 511
P.2d 721 (Utah 1973); Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Utah
2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1973).
The Utah Supreme Court has long recognized that the
Commission has no authority to assert jurisdiction to hear a
claim for compensation when an applicant has failed to give
notice to or file a claim for compensation with the Commission
within the prescribed limitations period for that injury.

In

Peterson v, Industrial Commission. 29 Utah 2d 446, 511 P.2d 721
(Utah 1973), claimant sought review of an order of the Commission

-13-

that adopted the conclusion of the ALJ that his claim for compensation and benefits was barred by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99.
In that matter, claimant was injured in the course of his employment in February, 1964.

No claim had been filed with the Commis-

sion because the insurance carrier for the claimant's

employer

admitted liability for coverage and paid expenses in connection
with

the temporary

disability.

The

insurance carrier

report of injury with the Commission on August, 1966.

filed a

In Septem-

ber, 1971, claimant filed with the Commission an application for
benefits
injury.

relating
The

to

an

Commission

aggravation
denied

the

of

the

request

1964
for

industrial
hearing

and

dismissed the matter on the basis that the statute of limitations
4
had expired under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-99.
Affirming the
Commission, the Utah Supreme Court held:
The filing of a final report by insurance
carriers is mandatory and does not, nor is it
intended to, confer any jurisdiction of the
settled matter upon the Industrial Commission.
Since the jurisdiction of the Industrial
Commission was not attempted to be invoked
for more than three years after the last
payment was made, the statute had run, and
the Commission was correct in refusing to
grant a hearing in the matter.
Peterson, 29 Utah 2d at 448, 511 P.2d at 722.

4

Since Applicant in

The eight-year tolling period under Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-99 became effective on May 21, 1981 and, therefore, was not
a subject of consideration in Peterson. See Ch. 287, S 6, Laws
of Utah 1981.
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the instant matter failed to file any notice of injury or claim
for

compensation

limitations
35-1-100

period

and

September,

with
as

35-1-99

1961

the

Commission

established

by

within
Utah

the

prescribed

Code Ann,

(CodeCo

1986)

for

the

and November,

1976,

the

Industrial

Sections

injuries

between

Commission

lacked the requisite jurisdiction to make an award of workers'
compensation

benefits.

Furthermore,

under Utah Code Ann. S 35-1-97
file

a report

report

by

of

the

injury with

insurer,

does

the statutory

requirement

(CodeCo 1986) that an employer
the Commission,

not

confer,

confer, jurisdiction upon the Commission.

nor

like
is

the

final

intended

to

Thus, the failure of

Kennecott, if any, to file a report of injury in this case has
absolutely no bearing on the issue of Applicant's failure to file
a claim for compensation within the time allowed by Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986). 5
Similarly, in Gardner v. Industrial Commission, 30 Utah
2d 377, 517 P.2d 1329 (Utah 1973), an employee sought review of a
Commission
alleged

order

awarding

industrial

injury

the

claimant

sustained

compensation

in July,

1968.

for
In

an
that

matter, no notice of the injury had been given to the Commission
until

February,

1972.

In

March

D

1972,

claimant

filed

an

The Commission contends in its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order that Kennecott's alleged failure to file a
report with the Commission as required by Utah Code Ann. Section
35-1-97 caused there to be no notice of Applicant's injuries
between September 1961 and November, 1976 with the Commission.
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application

for

hearing

with

the Commission

seeking

further

compensation some three years and seven months after the accident
and some three years and four months after the last payment of
compensation.

Reversing the Commission order awarding compensa-

tion, the Utah Supreme Court concluded:
The petitioners here simply urge that under
the facts of this case, the applicant did not
file his claim within the statutory time,
either from the date of accident or the date
of last compensation standpoint since three
years passed in either case, before application was filed, and thus has no basis for
receiving the requested compensation, — with
which we agree.
Gardner, 30 Utah 2d at 378, 517 P.2d at 1330.

See Mannes-Vale

Inc. v. Vale, 717 P.2d 709 (Utah 1986) (since applicant's claim
for compensation had not been filed within the stautory threeyear period as required by Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99, the
Commission

therefore had no jurisdiction to make any further

award of compensation). See also Jones v. Industrial Commission,
17 Utah 2d 28, 404 P.2d 27 (1965) and Frederickson v. Industrial
Commission,
medical

19 Utah

expenses,

2d 233, 429 P.2d

relating

to

an

981

earlier

(1967)

(claim for

industrial

injury,

denied on the grounds that no claim had been filed with the

b

Similarly, the eight-year tolling period under Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-99, which became effective on May 12, 1981, did
not apply to the Gardner matter. See Ch. 287, S 6, Laws of Utah
1981.
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' App 1 leant has not filed any claim of compensation for his
injuries between 1982 and 1984. However, by virtue of Applicant f s testimony at the August 20, 1986 hearing, the Commission
has been given notice of those injuries within the prescribed
limitations period and, therefore, arguably has obtained jurisdication over t h ^ p i r
es.
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i

wholly barred under Utah Code Ann, Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100
(CodeCo 1986).
In its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order,
the Commission takes the position that had Kennecott filed an
"Employer's

First

Report

of

Injury" with

the

Commission

as

required under Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-97 (CodeCo 1986), the
Commission would have had notice of Applicant's injuries between
September, 1961 and November, 1976, and therefore, proper jurisdiction to hear Applicant's claim for compensation in connection
with

those

Kennecott's

injuries.

The Commission's

Order

compliance

with

Ann,

Utah

Code

intimates that
Section

35-1-97

(CodeCo 1986) would have been sufficient to confer jurisdiction
upon the Commission to hear Applicant's claim for compensation
for those earlier injuries.

Thus, the Commission concluded that

Kennecott must not be allowed to escape liability by its alleged
failure to give notice to the Commission.
However, the Commission's contention that notice under
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986) is sufficient to
confer jurisdiction upon the Commission would completely nullify
any effect to be given to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-100 (Codeco
1986), and thus defeat the legislative intent and the purpose of
the statute.

Following the Commission's position to its logical

conclusion, the Commission would have automatic jurisdiction and
authority

over

every

industrial
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Accordingly, Kennecott requests the Court to set aside
that portion of the Commission's Order which imposes liability on
Kennecott to compensate Applicant for the percentage (61.5%) of
Applicant's total combined impairment that relates to its injuries between September, 1961 and November 1976.
II.

THERE EXISTS NO FACTUAL BASIS UPON WHICH THE
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION COULD SUPPORT A FINDING
OF FACT AND CONCLUSION OF LAW THAT APPLICANT
HAD COMPLIED WITH THE NOTICE REQUIREMENTS
UNDER SECTIONS 35-1-99 AND 35-1-100 WITH
REGARD TO HIS INJURIES BETWEEN SEPTEMBER,
1961 AND NOVEMBER, 1976.
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-85

(CodeCo 1986), which

governs the duty of the Commission to make findings of fact and
conclusions of law, provides, in pertinent part:
. • . The findings and conclusions of the
commission on questions of fact shall be
conclusive and final and shall not be subject
to review; such questions of fact shall
include ultimate facts and findings and
conclusions of the commission, . • .
Utah Code Ann, Section 35-1-84 (CodeCo 1986) limits the review of
the findings and conclusions of the Commission by this Court,
That provision provides, in pertinent part:
. . • Upon such review the court may affirm
or set aside such award, but only upon the
following grounds:
(1) That the commission acted without or in
excess of its powers;
(2) That the findings of fact do not support
the award.
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'•'
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'

'

42H,
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"Utah 1 9 8 4 ) .
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lor

iiijst

injuries

first
prior

to making an award of compensation for those injuries*

In order

for the Commission to have reached the conclusion that Kennecott
was liable for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961 and
November, 1976, or for any portion of a later injury attributable
in any part to those prior injuries, the Commission was required
to have made a finding of fact, based on substantial evidence
reviewable by this Court in the record, that Applicant complied
with

the

notice

requirements

under

Utah

Code

Ann,

Sections

35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986).
In the instant matter, the Commission made findings of
fact only with regard to the fact that Applicant sustained, among
others, injuries between September, 1961 and Novemberr 1976.

The

Commission, however, had made no findings of fact as to whether
the employer or the Commission

received notice of Applicant's

injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976.

Indeed,

there exists, as a matter of law, no factual basis upon which the
Commission could have supported a finding of fact that Applicant
complied
injuries.

with

the

notice

requirements

with

regard

to

those

Consequently, the Commission has properly not reached

the legal conclusion that Applicant gave notice to the Commission
that complied with the requirements of Utah Code Ann. Sections
35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986).

The Commission, neverthe-

less, has reached the legal conclusion that Kennecott bears legal
liability for Applicant's injuries between September, 1961 and
November, 1976.

Liability could not be imposed on Kennecott with
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Furthermore, the failure of the Industrial Commission
to make findings of fact and conclusions of law as to whether
Applicant satisfied the notice requirements under Utah Code Ann.
Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) is reversible error.
The Commission has the duty to make findings of fact and conclusions of law on all issues of material fact before it.
Ann. Section 35-1-85 (CodeCo 1986).
tory and may not be waived.

Utah Code

This requirement is manda-

Failure on the part of the Commis-

sion to make findings of fact that resolve all issues of material
fact

necessary

entered

thereon

to

justify

the conclusions

is reversible

error.

of

law and order

Parks v. Zions First

National Bank, 673 P.2d 590, 601 (Utah 1983); Kinkella v. Bauqh,
660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983); Rucker v. Dalton, 598 P.2d 1336,
1338

(Utah

1979).

The Utah

Supreme

Court

in Rucker

aptly

observed:
The importance of complete, accurate and
consistent findings of fact in a case tried
by a judge is essential to the resolution of
dispute under the proper rule of law.
To
that end the findings should be sufficiently
detailed and include enough subsidiary facts
to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.
Rucker, 598 P.2d at 1338.
In the instant matter, the Commission failed to make
findings of fact with regard to whether Applicant satisfied the
notice

requirements

of

Utah

Code

Ann.

Sections

35-1-99

and

35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) to support a legal conclusion that the
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:* r permanent

tut,a I

disability are subject to Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo
1986).

See Mecham v. Industrial Commission of Utahf 692 P.2d

783f 786 (Utah 1984); Buxton v. Industrial Commission, 587 P.2d
121 (Utah 1978).

Thus, failure on the part of a claimant to file

a timely claim for permanent total disability under that provision bars recovery.
The purpose of the limitations provision in Utah Code
Ann. Section 35-1-99 was aptly stated in Kennecott Copper Company
v. Industrial Commission, 597 P.2d 875f 877 (Utah 1979):
The purpose of that statute, in common with
all statutes of limitation, is that potential
claims or controversy should sometime come to
rest, and thus enable employers and employees
to get along in peace and good will without
controversies hovering in the wings. There
are other valid reasons for the requirement
that such claims should be asserted within
some reasonable and specified time.
If an
investigation is necessary, it can be made
promptly while the evidence and the witnesses
are available. This is a safeguard not only
against possible fictitious or fraudulent
claims, for real or imagined old injuries,
but it also calls attention to any necessity
that may exist for remedial steps to protect
the other employees from injury.
Furthermore, the longer the period of limiation, the
longer the employer must maintain records,
and set up and carry reserves (or insurance),
to take care of such possible claims. While
the burden of the things just mentioned may
initially appear to fall upon the employer
(industry), it must be realized that they
must also be borne by other workers, and
ultimately by the public.
Kennecott Copper, 592 P.2d at 876.

Here, the Utah Supreme Court

has reiterated important public policies regarding the salutary
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(CodeCo 1986) and, thus, thwarts those policies.
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injuries and, therefore, are properly the responsibility of the
Second Injury Fund.
1986) •

See Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-69 (CodeCo

See also Second Injury Fund v. Perry's Mill & Cabinet

Shop. 684 P.2d 1269 (Utah 1984); Jacobsen Construction v. Hair,
667 P.2d 25 (Utah 1983).
IV*

KENNECOTT WAS DENIED DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN
CONNECTION WITH APPLICANT'S WORKERS' COMPENSATION AWARD, SINCE KENNECOTT HAD RECEIVED NO
NOTICE PRIOR TO THE HEARING THAT THERE WOULD
BE ANY CONSIDERATION OF APPLICANT'S SUBSEQUENT INDUSTRIAL INJURIES.
Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-82.51 (CodeCo 1986) pro-

vides that the Commission shall give notice and an opportunity to
be heard to all parties whose rights may be affected by a compensation award:
Hearings shall be held by the commission upon
reasonable notice to be given to each interested party, . . . All parties in interests
shall have the right to be present at any
hearing, . . . and to present such testimony
as may be pertinent to the controversy before
the commission and shall have the right to
cross-examine.
Utah
administrative

law

clearly

agency

establishes

issued

without

that

an

sufficient

order

of

an

notice

to

affected parties is violative of due process guaranteed under the
Federal

and

State

Constitutions.

Morris

v.

Public

Service

Commission, 7 Utah 2d 167, 321 P.2d 644 (1958); Fuller-Toponce
Truck Co. v. Public Service Comm.f 99 Utah 28, 96 P.2d

722

(1939); Denver & Rio Grande Western Railway Co. v. Industrial
Commission, 74 Utah 316, 279 P. 612 (1929).
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In the instant matter the notice given by the
Commission provided only that an application
of Neil R. Morris for a certificate of public
convenience and necessity and to assume the
operating rights of Robert Watson would be
entertained by the Commission. The issue of
unqualified cancellation of the certificate
which Watson held was not before the Commission.
The Commission has attempted
to
utilize the evidence in the hearing proper 1v
before it to order the cancel 1 at ion [o f *

I
the

the PSf
I

hilliiout proper notice and without due proceM

cancelling

to
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and Conclusions of

i
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Supreme

l

Watson certificate], not properly before the
Commission,
Morris. 7 Utah 2d at 170-171, 321 P.2d at 646.
This

principle

of

due

process

applies

proceedings held by the Industrial Commission.

equally

to

In Denver & Rio

Grande Western Railway Co. v. Industrial Commission, 74 Utah 316,
279 P. 612 (1929), the Industrial Commission proceeded to amend
its findings of fact without giving the railroad company the
opportunity

to offer

additional

evidence.

In remanding

the

amended findings of fact of the Commission, the Utah Supreme
Court stated:
Notice and an opportunity to be heard are
elementary requirements of due process of law
when the rights of a party are to be affected
by judicial proceedings.
[Citations omitted.] Our Workmens' Compensation Law, inferentially at least, provides that the commission shall give notice and an opportunity to
be heard to all persons whose rights may be
affected by its award.
[Citation omitted.]
Indeed, if the Legislature should enact a law
dispensing with notice and an opportunity to
be heard to a party whose rights will be
affected by an award of the commission, such
law should be a nullity.
Denver & Rio Grande, 74 Utah at 319, 279 P. at 612-613.
In the instant matter, the notice of hearing given by
the Commission related solely to Applicant's claim for compensation for an injury that occurred on September 21, 1961.

The

issue of Kennecott's liability with regard to Applicant's injuries between September, 1966 and June, 1984 was not before the
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° Furthermore, for the reasons stated in Sections 1 and II •"
above, the Commission did not have jurisdiction to address
Kennecott f s liability with regard to Applicant's injuries between
September, 1961 and November, 1976.
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process of law as guaranteed under both the Federal and State
Constitutions.

The Commission acted without authority and beyond

its jurisdiction.
Order

Accordingly, that portion of the Commission's

that

pertains

Applicant's

injuries

to

Kennecott's

between

liability

September,

1966

with

regard

and

June,

to

1984

should be set aside by this Court.
CONCLUSION
Applicant filed a claim of compensation for his September 21f 1961 injury.

The Notice of Hearing given by the Commis-

sion related solely to Applicant's claim for compensation for the
1961

injury.

The Commission,

nevertheless, made a finding of

liability against Kennecott with respect to Applicant's injuries
between September, 1961 and June, 1984.

Applicant

never filed

timely notice of his injuries between September, 1961 and November, 1976 with
September,

1961

the Commission
injury,

nor

and, with

has

the exception

Applicant

filed

a

of

the

claim

for

compensation with the Commission with regard to those injuries.
Thus, the Commission

lacked

jurisdiction

under Utah Code Ann.

Sections 35-1-99 and 35-1-100 (CodeCo 1986) to make any award for
compensation

to Applicant

in connection with his

injuries sus-

tained between September, 1961 and November, 1976.
Even if Applicant had sought to be compensated now for
those earlier injuries, there exists simply no factual basis upon
which

the Commission

can

support
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a

finding

of

fact

that

the

Commission had adequate notice of Applicant's injuries between
September, 1961 and November, 1976 to confer jurisdiction upon
the Commission over those injuries.
Furthermore, even assuming that this Court finds that
the Commission had adequate notice to confer jurisdiction for
Applicant's

injuries between

1961 and 1976, the Commission's

award of compensation relating to those injuries is nevertheless
improper because Applicant's claim for those injuries, having
never been filed timely, is barred by the statute of limitations
under Utah Code Ann. Section 35-1-99 (CodeCo 1986).
Finally, that portion of the Commission's order that
imposes liability on Kennecott for Applicant's injuries between
September,

1966

and

June,

1984,

without

prior

notice

to

Kennecott, is made without due process of law as guaranteed by
the Federal and State Constitutions.
Accordingly, Kennecott

requests that

this Court set

aside the Commission's award for workers' compensation benefits
to Applicant.
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

3olff day of June 1987.

WM4r.

JA^IES w:

ELEGANTE

gXL J./POS
of and for
PARSONS, BEHLE & LATIMER
Attorneys for Kennecott Corporation
185 South State Street, Suite 700
P. 0. Box 11898
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0898
Telephone: (801) 532-1234
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed, postage
prepaid, four (4) true and correct copies of the foregoing document to the following on this 3e:tU

day of June, 1987:

The Industrial Commission of Utah
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800
David L. Wilkinson, Esq.
Ralph Finlayson, Esq.
Utah Attorney General's Office
236 State Capitol Bldg.
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114
Erie V. Boorman, Esq.
Administrator, Second Injury Fund
160 East 300 South
P.O. Box 5800
Salt Lake City, Utah 84110-5800
Angelo Maldonado,
2363 Green Street, No. A
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

298:061287A
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APPENDIX A

35-1-99

NOTICE OF INJURY AND CLAIM FOR COMPENSATION — LIMITATION OF ACTION — TOLLING
PERIOD FOR FILING CLAIM.

When an employee claiming to have suffered an injury in
the service of his employer fails to give notice to his employer
of the time and place where the accident and injury occurred, and
of the nature of the accident and injury, within 48 hours, when
possible, or fails to report for medical treatment within that
time, the compensation provided for herein shall be reduced 15%;
provided, that knowledge of the injury obtained from any source
on the part of the employer, his managing agent, superintendent,
foreman, or other person in authority, or knowledge of any assertion by the injured sufficient

to afford an opportunity to the

employer to make an investigation into the facts and to provide
medical treatment is equivalent to this notice; and no defect or
inaccuracy in the notice subjects the claimant to this reduction,
if there was no intention to mislead or prejudice the employer in
making his defense, and the employer was not, in fact, so misled
or prejudiced.

If no notice of the accident and injury is given

to the employer within one year after the date of the accident,
the right to compensation is wholly barred.
pensation

If no claim for com-

is filed with the Industrial Commission within three

years after the date of the accident or the date of the last payment of compensation, the right to compensation is wholly barred.
However, the filing of a report or notice of accident or injury
with the Industrial Commission,

the employer, or its insurance

carrier, together with the payment of any compensation benefit or
the furnishing of medical treatment by the employer or an insurance carrier, tolls the period

for filing

the claim until the

employer or its carrier notifies the employee, in writing, of its
denial

of

liability

or

accident or injury, with

further

liability

for

the

industrial

instructions upon the notification of

denial to the employee to contact the Industrial Commission for
further

advice

or

employee's rights.

assistance

to

preserve

or

protect

the

The claim for compensation in any event shall

be filed within 8 years after the date of the accident.

APPENDIX B

35-1-100

DUTY OF EMPLOYEE TO FILE NOTICE OF ACCIDENT WITH COMMISSION — COPY TO EMPLOYER
— TIME LIMITATION ~ JURISDICTION OF
COMMISSION,

Whenever an employee sustains an accident arising out
of or in the course of his employment, the employee shall file
with the commission, in writing, notice of such accident, with a
copy to the employer; if such notice is so filed within three
years of the time of the accident or within the time limitation
provided in section 35-1-99, the commission shall obtain jurisdiction to make its award when the injury becomes apparent.

APPENDIX C

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case Nos. 85000374 & 86000654
*
*

ANGELO MALDONADO,
Applicant,

FINDIN
*
*

vs.
KENNECOTT
(SELF-INSURED) and
SECOND INJURY FUND,

CONCLUSIONS
AND ORDER

Defendants.

*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

HEARING:

Hearing Room 334f Industrial Commission of Utah, 160
East 300 South, Salt Lake City, Utah, on August 20,
1986, at 8:30 o'clock a.m.; same being pursuant to
Order and Notice of the Commission.

BEFORE:

Timothy C. Allen, Administrative Law Judge.

APPEARANCES:

Angelo Maldonado, PRO SE.
Kennecott was represented by Laurie Priano, Personnel
Benefits Analyst.
The Second Injury Fund was represented by Erie V.
Boorman, Administrator.

At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the Administrative Law
Judge notified the parties that since the Applicant had previously filed an
Occupational Disease Claim for hearing loss, that thai claim would also be
joined in the Applicants Claim for Permanent and Total Disability Benefits.
By way of explanation, the Applicant originally filed an Application for
Hearing Loss based on harmful industrial noise encountered while at Kennecott.
The Application was set for hearing and heard before Judge Martinez of the
Commission on January 9, 1986. The employer, Kennecott, fully defended the
matter and as such has been accorded their due process rights with respect to
the Applicant's hearing loss claim. After the matter had been submitted to a
Medical Panel by Judge Martinez, the Panel entered its Report dated March 17,
1986. However, before the Medical Panel Report could be distributed to the
parties, Mr. Maldonado contacted the Commission and requested that his hearing
loss claim be withdrawn. Accordingly, on April 8, 1986, Judge Martinez caused
a letter to be written to the parties indicating that the hearing loss claim
had been withdrawn and was dismissed without prejudice.

ANGELO KALDONADO
ORDER
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Just prior to the Dismissal of the Hearing Loss Claim, the Applicant
filed an Application for Hearing claiming disability benefits for an
industrial accident he sustained at Kennecott on September 21, 1961. This
claim was assigned Case No. 86000654, and was heard by the undersigned on
August 20, 1986. At that hearing, it became clear that although the Applicant
was without the benefit of legal counsel, that his claim was a claim for
permanent and total disability. It also became evident that not only had the
Applicant sustained an industrial injury on September 21, 1961, but that he
had also sustained industrial accidents on September 22, 1966, January 21,
1971, November 16, 1976, March 6, 1980, November 18, 1982, April 26, 1983, and
June 20, 1984, all while employed by Kennecott. Following that hearing, the
Administrative Law Judge caused the Medical Panel Report concerning the
Applicant's hearing loss to be distributed to the parties. The parties were
advised that they should file Objections to the Medical Panel Report or that
the same would be admitted into evidence.
In that Report, the Medical Panel had concluded that the Applicant
was exposed to hannful industrial noise at Kennecott, and that "this is his
only source of noise exposure/' The employer responded to the Panel Report
indicating that the Commission had no jurisdiction to adjudicate the hearing
loss claim. This position is clearly not supported by the law which provides
the Commission with continuing jurisdiction to modify prior findings.
Further, the Defendant, Kennecott, was notified at the hearing of August 20,
1986, that the Admininstrative Law Judge would be considering all of the
Applicants injuries and claims at one time so as to minimize continual
litigation. Further, since the employer had retired the Applicant because of
his hearing loss, it was apparent that that hearing loss was significant
enough to have some bearing or effect on the Applicants claim for permanent
and total disability. In addition, since the hearing loss claim had been
dismissed without prejudice, it was abundantly clear to the Administrative Law
Judge that more than enough jurisdiction existed to reopen that claim 8nd
adjudicate the same in light of the Applicant's permanent and total disability
claim. The employer also took the position that the only claim properly
before the Commission was that involving an alleged industrial accident in
1961. In that respect, the employer contended that since they had failed to
file any Employer's First Reports of Injury, that the Commission was thereby
foreclosed from exercising jurisdiction over the Applicant's claim. This
position of the employer is fallacious and incorrect, which will be explored
later in this Order.
Thereafter, the claim was referred to the Division of Rehabilitation
Services for their evaluation after the Administrative Law Judge had made a
tentative finding that Mr. Maldonado was permanently and totally disabled.
The Division submitted its report indicating that the Applicant was not a
feasible candidate for rehabilitation and retraining. Kennecott then objected
to that Report of the Division of Rehabilitation Services, and taking their
independent rehabilitation counselor's report out of context, contended that
the Applicant was a candidate for rehabilitation and retraining. Yet, the
bottom line of the report from Mr. Heal is that MMr. Maldonado is not a viable

ANGELO MALDONADO
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candidate for vocational rehabilitation presently, and would not be unless his
physical activity level is increased in some way to allow him to participate
in vocational rehabilitation.•• It is also interesting to note that Kennecott
concluded that the Applicant could not perform or be retrained to perform any
other job within the bargaining unit, and so, he was given a permanent total
medical retirement effective October 1, 1985. Following receipt of Kennecott1s
Objection, the file was in a posture for the issuance of an Order, when the
Administrative Law Judge reviewed the file further and determined that a
Medical Panel evaluation would be needed to determine the extent of the
Applicant's impairment due to his industrial accidents at Kennecott.
Thereafter, the file was referred to the Medical Panel for its evaluation.
The Medical Panel Report was received and copies were distributed to the
parties. No objections having been received to the Medical Panel Report, it
is admitted into evidence.
Being fully advised in the premises, the
Admininstrative Law Judge is prepared to enter the following

FINDINGS OF FACT:
Angelo Maldonado started working as a laborer for Kennecott in 1961,
when he was eighteen years of age. He originally started out as a laborer and
was able to work his way up to the job of a puncher, which required that he
keep the air vents under the furnace cleared. On September 21, 1961, Mr.
Maldonado was working on the number two convertor, going up a walkway when he
slipped on oil slick and fell, twisting his back and then striking his low
back and neck on the metal platform.
The evidence on the file clearly
indicates that the Applicant was taken to the Kennecott Clinic, where he
reported his injury to the medical assistant, who faithfully reported in the
records that the Applicant was hurt on the job. The Applicant was given an
ice lolly on his back and neck and he was also given Percodan. He stayed at
the Clinic all of that day and was then told to return to the Clinic the
following day. He did so, and his timecard was turned in by the Clinic daily
for approximately two weeks so that he could continue to receive his regular
pay. The daily treatment received by the Applicant consisted of Percodan and
lying around the Clinic. After this course of treatment, Mr. Maldonado was
placed on -light duty", where he sat around the coffee room for another week
and a half.
Thereafter, the Applicant was able to perform some work. Since he
was still complaining, his employer sent him to Dr. Kuhe on December 27,
1961. Dr. Kuhe took x-rays of the Applicant and indicated that his problem
was non-industrial. Mr. Maldonado was then referred to Dr. Boyd Holbrook for
an orthopedic consultation, and in March of 1962, the Applicant was given a
lumbosacroal brace, which he was told to wear at all times. He was also given
msucle relaxants and pain killers. He continued to have spasms in his back at
that time. On May 3, 1963, Mr. Maldonado received a cortisone injection in
his back.
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On September 22, 1966f Mr. Maldonado sustained another industrial
accident. As contained in the Kennecott medical records, it indicates that
••fell on job and caught self with left arm - now has pain in left back and
left arm." It further indicates that the Applicant received an injection and
was having some subscapular pain. In 1963, the Applicant was involved in an
automobile accident when a lady ran a stop sign and struck his car on the
right front passenger side. As a result, the Applicant was shaken up and
experienced some spasms in his back, but lost no time from work.
On January 21, 1971, the Applicant was working on the number three
convertor, when a plank fell and struck him on his hard hat, with the result
he sustained a neck injury and was treated with traction in the company clinic.
Again, this history was faithfully reported in the employer's medical records
kept by the Wasatch Medical Group, which had been retained by Kennecott to
provide medical services to their employees. The Applicant was x-rayed at
that time and the reports indicate the same was negative for a fracture or
dislocation. On July 19,1973, the Applicant reported to the Wasatch Medical
Group and their office note indicates that he had an old fracture of his
fourth lumbar vertebra with an old fracture of his coccyx. The Applicant's
next injury occurred apparently on November 7, 1976, when he fell down some
stairs and landed on some ice. The Applicant was treated by Dr. Brasher, a
company physician, and was released to return to work on November 16. 1976.
Mr. Maldonado was then injured on March 6, 1980, when he fell on the
west crane landing, twisting his left knee according to his testimony.
However, the medical records of the company clinic would seem to indicate that
the right knee was injured. Mr. Maldonado was examined by Dr. Coda and was
given ice.
On November 18, 1982, the Applicant injured his back while lifting
cables on the east crane platform. He and a fellow employee were lifting the
cables when the other employee lost his grip, giving the full weight to the
Applicant. He reported to the company clinic and was seen by Dr. Reese who
.diagnosed a muscle strain of the lower back on the left side. Mr. Maldonado
was fiven an ice lolly massage and he was also given Darvocet and Soma. He
was able to continue working at Kennecott and had no further problems until
April 26, 1983. On that date, as he was getting out of a truck, his left leg
gave way and his right knee was twisted. He reported to the company clinic
where he was examined and an ace wrap was applied along with ice. At that
time, he was diagnosed as having a possible strained ligament.
On June 20, 1984, Mr. Maldonado and a co-worker, were lifting a forty
pound motor which was to be installed in a screw conveyor. As they were
carrying the motor up two flights of stairs, the Applicant's left leg gave out
on him and he fell down a few of the stairs and wrenched his back in the
process. He reported his injury to Dr. Reese and was then sent to Dr. Lamb by

ANGELO HALDONADO
ORDER
PAGE FIVE

Kennecott. He was temporarily and totally disabled for the period June 21,
1984, through July 2, 1984. He then returned to work on July 3, 1984, and
continued working.
On January 2, 1985, the Applicant reported to Dr. Reese with
continuing back pain, and at that time, the doctor advised him not to lift or
climb, which he could not avoid in his job. He last worked for Kennecott on
March 31, 1985. At that time, he was taken off the job by Kennecott and was
given a permanent and total disability pension based on severe hearing loss.
He was certified for his retirement as of March 31, 1985, but the actual
pension benefits do not commence until six months subsequent to that date,
which explains the October 1, 1985, date previously indicated hereinabove.
Kennecott relied on the impairment rating given by their medical expert, Dr.
Sonkens, which indicated that the Applicant had a 35% binaural hearing loss or
a 12% whole man impairment due to industrial noise while employed by Kennecott.
Although that was the basis of the permanent and total disability, the records
should also reflect that the Applicant was suffering from degenerative disc
disease and retropatellar chondritis of both knees. Dr. Reese concluded that
the Applicant was permanently and totally disabled as the result of spinal
stenosis and retropatellar cohondritis of both knees, however, the final
retirement was based on the Applicant's severe hearing loss resulting from his
exposure to industrial noise while employed by Kennecott.
As indicated
previously, the medical panel convened by the Industrial Commission to
evaluate the Applicant's ^earin^ loss found that he had a 7.5 percent binaural
hearing loss or a(3% impairment)of the whole person.
With the file in this posture, the case was referred to a Medical
Panel for ^valnaHnn pf the orthopedic injuries. The Panel found that the
Applicant has "a (foi permanent^ partial impainnent Jo f the whole person due to
low back problems. The Panel concluded that as a result of the original
industrial accident of September 21, 1961, the Applicant sustained a 15%)
permanent partial impairment, and that he has a QjC} impairment of the whole
person due to the industrial injury of September 22, 1966, a (Z^TJpermanent
partial impairment due to the industrial accident of November 16, 1976, a (iy
impairment of^the whole person due to the industrial injury of Novemer 18,
1982, and a fTv impairment of the whole person due to the industrial injury of
June 20, 19847 The Panel also found a (4y impairment of the whole person due
to arthritis in the Applicant's knees as a result of pre-existing conditions.
The Panel also found that there was no impairment due to conditions existing
before September 21, 1961, and that the industrial accident of November 18,
1982, did not aggravate a pre-existing condition other than the prior
industrial accident of 1961, and the Panel made the same finding with respect
to the industrial injury of June 20, 1984. With respect to the industrial
accident of April 26, 1983, the Panel found that this industrial accident
caused only a temporary aggravation of the Applicant's chronic progressive
degenerative knee condition. The Administrative Law Judge adopts the findings
of the Medical Panel as his own.
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At the present, the Applicant's daily routine consists of some
reading on a very limited basis, since he is unable to sit for more that ten
or fifteen minutes. He has constant spasms and throbbing pain in his back,
and he is able to climb some stairs and can walk for a limited distance.
On October 31, 1986, the Social Security Administration entered its
decision that the Applicant was permanently and totally disabled. While not
binding on the Administrative Law Judge, it is evidence of the extent of the
Applicant's disability. As previously indicated, Kennecottfs own evaluator,
Alan Heal, found that the Applicant was not a viable candidate for
rehabilitation training, as did the Division of Rehabilitation Services as
required by Section 35-1-67, Utah Code Annotated.
Accordingly, the
overwhelming preponderance of the evidence on the file clearly supports a
finding of permanent and total disability as the result of his industrial
accidents
and his occupational hearing loss claim.
Accordingly, the
Applicant is entitled to permanent and total disability benefits. Although
the law is somewhat unclear in this area, it would appear to the Administrative
Law Judge that the permanent total disability award should be based on the
compensation rate in effect at the time of the Applicant's last industrial
injury of June 20, 1984, which will entitle him to the maximum compensation
benefits of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks.
Finally, the Defendant, Kennecott, has urged that the Applicant's
claim be dismissed for permanent and total disability for the reason that the
Commission file contains no Employer's First Reports of Injury for any of the
industrial accidents. This case involves a situation where the self-insured
employer, Kennecott, was clearly aware of the industrial accidents of Mr.
Maldonado since he reported them to their dispensary, and they were faithfully
recorded by the dispensary personnel. Therefore, Kennecott had the burden of
submitting both the First Report of Injury and the first medical report,
neither of which were filed for the Applicant's industrial injuries. The
Applicant had no reason to file any type of Application for Hearing or other
request for litigation with respect to his injuries, since Kennecott paid him
his benefits and provided the medical care that ho needed. For Kennecott to
now argue that they should not be liable for benefits because they did not
give the required legal notice to the Commission is an attempt by Kennecott to
take advantage of its own failure to comply with their legal responsibilities.
The Administrative Law Judge will not allow Kennecott's failure to comply with
the law to work or redound to their benefit. Therefore, the Administrative
Law Judge finds that Kennecott is estopped from raising this defense.
There being no permanent aggravation of the pre-existing knee problems
by the industrial accidents, the Administrative Law Judge finds tha^ there is
/ no Secon* Tnjurv FuT>d partiripa* \on indicate^- Accordingly, Kennecott shall
be liable for the initial permanent and total disability award, which shall
commence effective April 1, 1985. Pursuant to Section 35-1-67, the Second
Injury Fund will then commence permanent and total disability benefits to the
Applicant at that same weekly rate effective March 25, 1991.
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW:
Angelo Maldonado is permanently and totally disabled as the result of
his industrial accident at 'Kennecott and his occupationally caused hearing
loss.

ORDER:
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that Kennecott pay Angelo Maldonado
compensation at the rate of $255.00 per week for 312 weeks for a total of
$79,560.00, as compensation for his permanent and total disability resulting
from his industrial accidents and occupational hearing loss at Kennecott.
These benefits shall commence effective April 1, 1985, with accrued amounts to
be paid in a lump sum including interest of 8% per annum from April 8, 1985,
until benefits are made current.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the Second Injury Fund place Angelo
Maldonado on their payroll effective March 25, 1991, with benefits to be paid
at the rate of $255.00 per week for as long as the Applicant shall live or
until further order of the Commission.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that any Motion for Review of the foregoing
shall be filed in writing within fifteen (15) days of the date hereof,
specifying in detail the particular errors and objections, and, unless so
filed, this Order shall be final and not subject to r e v i e w ^ appeal.

TimothvPy Allen
AdniiTrTstr^tive Law Judge
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this

j&

day of January, 1987,

Commissioiv^Secretary

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on January I If . 1987, a copy of the attached
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, in the case of Angelo
Maldonado, issued January
/ ^ 1987, was mailed to the following persons at
the following addresses, postage paid:

Angelo Maldonado, 2363 Green Street, #A, SLC, UT 84106
•Laurie Priano, Kennecott, P. 0. Box 525, Bingham Canyon, UT
84006-0525
Erie Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By.

'JL

Wilxia

APPENDIX D

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH
Case Nos.

85000374 & 86000654
*
*
*

ANGELO MALDONADO,
Applicant,

DENIAL OF
*
*
*
*

vs.
KENNECOTT
(SELF-INSURED) and/or
SECOND INJURY FUND
Defendants.

MOTION FOR REVIEW

*
*
*
*

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

On or about January 14, 1987, an Order was entered by an Administrative Law Judge of the Commission wherein benefits were awarded in the above
entitled case.
On or about February 11, 1987, the Commission received a Motion for
Review from the Defendants, Kennecott, by and through their attorney.
Thereafter, the matter was referred to the entire Commission for
review pursuant to Section 35-1-82.53, Utah Code Annotated. The Commission
has reviewed the file in the above entitled case and we are of the opinion
that the Motion for Review should be denied and the Order of the Administrative Law Judge affirmed. In affirming, the Commission adopts the Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law of the Administrative Law Judge.
IT IS THEREFORE ORDERED that the Order of the Administrative Law
Judge of January 14, 1987, shall be, and the same is hereby, affirmed and the
Motion for Review shall be, and the same is hereby, denied.

<|§il
Passed by the Industrial Commission
of Utah, Salt Lake City, Utah, this
1987.

,inda J. S
Commissio

L. Nielsen
Commissioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I certify that on March l&
1987, a copy of the attached
Denial of Motion for Review in the case of Angelo Maldonado, issued
March (p
1987, was mailed to the following persons at the following
addresses, postage paid:
Angelo Maldonado, 2363 Green Street, //A, SLC, UT 84106
Laurie Priano, Kennecott, P. 0. Box 525, Bingham Canyon, UT
84006-0525
James M. Elegante, Atty., P. 0. Box 11898, SLC, UT 84147-0898
Erie V. Boorman, Administrator, Second Injury Fund

THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH

By.
Wilma

